Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana Supreme Court Adjusts a Legislative Miscalculation by Cancienne, Michael A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 65 | Number 2
Winter 2005
Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Adjusts a Legislative Miscalculation
Michael A. Cancienne
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Michael A. Cancienne, Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana Supreme Court Adjusts a Legislative Miscalculation, 65 La. L. Rev. (2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol65/iss2/9
Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Adjusts a Legislative Miscalculation
In Smith v. LASERS, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted an
outdated approach to state employees' rights in public retirement
systems when it construed the benefits derived from public retirement
programs as mere gratuities. Additionally, the Court embraced the
incorrect Contract Clause analysis when considering claims involving
the State altering its own obligations. The majority of other states
now recognize that rights exist in public retirement systems from the
moment that employees enter the system. The Louisiana Supreme
Court should have embraced this view, especially in light of the
wording of Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution which
specifically recognizes membership in a statewide retirement system
as contractually based.
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INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Board of Trustees of Louisiana State Employees'
Retirement System (Smith v. LASERS),' the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied 161 Department of Corrections' workers certain retirement
benefits that were statutorily provided for them at the time of their
retirement. Primarily at issue in the case was whether such benefits
should be considered contractual in nature. In concluding that the
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Smith v. Bd. of Trustees of Louisiana State Employees' Ret. Sys., 2002-
2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100., rehearing denied, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1179,
124 S. Ct. 1414 (2004).
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workers had no rights in the benefits, the Court embraced the
outdated idea that public retirement systems are mere gratuities,
subject to unconstrained legislative modification. This casenote
questions the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision to embrace such
an outdated view of retirement benefits. Additionally, this casenote
suggest that the Court should have abandoned the classification
scheme it embraced and given public retirement benefits greater
protection, as outlined in the Louisiana Constitution and followed by
the bulk of other states. While suggesting the Court's view of
retirement benefits is outdated and fails to give proper deference to
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, this casenote questions the
Contract Clause analysis embraced by the Court in Smith v. LASERS
and suggests had the Court embraced the proper test, the outcome
may have been different.
In Part I, this casenote sets the stage for the debate by outlining
the relevant parties and the applicable statutory and constitutional
provisions at issue in LASERS. Part II then presents the Court's
opinion. This section will establish the rationale the Court adopted
when deciding LASERS. Part 1I highlights the differences between
the majority and dissenting opinions regarding the classification of
the benefits provided for by the statute in question, establishing that
the majority's view of the benefits provided for by the statute in
question was misguided and provided inadequate protection to state
employees in light of the constitutional provisions protecting such
benefits. Part V examines the differing standards applied by the
Court regarding the Contract Clauses of the Louisiana and United
States Constitutions. This section will discuss the erroneous Contract
Clause standard adopted by the majority, and how the outcome of the
case may have differed had the Court applied the correct standard.
Finally, Part V looks to other states to provide insight into the
determination the Court should have embraced regarding the
classification of retirement benefits. From this, this casenote will
show the Louisiana Supreme Court erred when deciding Smith v.
LASERS, primarily because the majority incorrectly classified the
benefits provided for by the statute in question and misapplied the
Contract Clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions.
I. RETIREMENT POWER STRUGGLES: THE FACTUAL AND
STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF SMITH v. LASERS
Because of the nature of public employment,2 stable and relatively
financially advantageous retirement benefits are typically earned by
state workers. Maintaining a productive workforce is partially
2. See infra note 63-64 and accompanying text.
NOTES 8832005]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
dependent upon these benefits. Smith v. LASERS considered the
extent that the legislature can alter a statutorily provided retirement
benefit and when the legislature may alter such a benefit.
A. The Plaintiffs: One-hundred sixty-one Department of
Corrections Workers
With an eye on taking advantage of a law constructed to their
benefit, 161 Louisiana Department of Corrections workers retired
between January and March of 2002.' These workers were soon
rehired, again entering state service and the state retirement system
pursuant to the law at the time. Many of the workers did not miss a
single day of work, retiring on Friday and returning to work on the
following Monday.4 For operations of the Department of Corrections
facilities, it was as if the workers had never retired.'
While the workers' retirement did not affect the operation of the
Department of Corrections, the workers' status as employees of the
Department was affected because of their decision to retire. When the
workers returned to work, they were treated as new employees and
placed on probation for six months in accordance with the applicable
Civil Service rules. However, even though the employees were treated
as new employees, this was presumable only for administrative
purposes, as none of the employees complained about a reduction in
responsibility or rank. During this probationary period, the workers
were not entitled to the same process with regard to their dismissal as
they were before their retirement.
The workers also lost portions of their accumulated sick and annual
leave when they retired. Sick or annual leave in excess of 300 hours
was counted as service credit, but leave up to 300 hours was lost.7 The
3. Smith, 851 So. 2dll00.
4. Record at 135, Smith, 851 So. 2d 1100 (testimony of Shannon Templet).
Ms. Templet is employed in the Human Resources Department of the Department
of Corrections. Her testimony was used to provide a clearer understanding of the
financial ramifications of the plaintiffs' retirements.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 83. When a new state employee is hired, their first six months are
considered probationary, and the employee can be dismissed without cause. None
of the 161 workers complained at trial or on appeal of being dismissed without
cause, so reliance on this as an impairment to reemployment is suspect.
7. Id at 100. While the employees received "service credit" for their leave,
the credit is not momentarily equal to the employee actually utilizing the leave. For
example, Mr. Gregg Smith testified he had in excess of twelve-hundred hours of
accumulated leave available and received one year's service credit for the hours.
His expected retirement benefit was $19,000 while his expected salary was $52,000.
Should Mr. Smith get ill after being reemployed under the law at the time, he would
not have any leave available and would be able to only receive his retirement
benefits. Id. at 101-02.
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employees also lost all of their compensatory time.8 The 161 workers
lost over 11,800 hours of compensatory time.9
Lastly, for the workers who retired and did not return to work
immediately (even those workers who missed only one day), their
"anniversary dates" were changed.'" Such a change negatively
affected when the worker would receive their annual four percent pay
raise. Some of the workers had their anniversary dates deferred for
more than three months."
B. The Defendant: The Louisiana State Employees 'Retirement
System
LASERS is an executive branch agency 2 that enjoys the
privileges and powers of a corporation,'3 and was founded by the
legislature in 1946.' 4 It is designed as a "trust fund created to provide
retirement and other benefits for state officers and employees and
their beneficiaries" and manages more than $6 billion in assets. 5
LASERS receives its funding from state employees, employers', and
interest earnings. 6
C. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416: Designating Benefits for
Retired State Employees who Reenter State Service
The benefits retired state employees receive are outlined in Title
II of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.' 7 Title II is a consolidation of
previous law enacted to "effectively comply with the mandate of
8. Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100, 1110 n.7.
Compensatory time is time that the employer credits to a worker in lieu of overtime
and can be used as sick or annual leave, but is not credited as service time upon
retirement. According to Ms. Templet, "Once you separate from state service, you
lost . . .your compensatory time and you can't get it back even if you are
reemployed." Record at 131 (testimony of Shannon Templet).
9. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1115 (Knoll, J., dissenting). Mr. Gregg Smith, the
plaintiff and a Department of Corrections employee for over twenty-five years, had
over a week worth of compensatory time. Record at 97.
10. Record at 134 (testimony of Shannon Templet).
11. Id. at 135.
12. Id. at 132.
13. Petition, Smith, 851 So. 2d 1100. See also La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-676
(1993) (recognizing that statewide retirement systems can be considered to be state
agencies, or at a minimum, entities of the state).
14. See Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, at http://www.
lasers. state. la.us.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:1 (2004).
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Article X, Section 29(E)" of the Louisiana Constitution." The state
employees' retirement system (LASERS) is governed pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:400-606. Membership in the
statewide retirement system is determined by the legislature.' 9
1. Pre-2001: Options for Employees Choosing to Reenter
State Service
When a state employee enrolled in LASERS reenters state
service, their benefits are dictated pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 11:416.0 Prior to June 30, 2001, Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416 offered three options to retired state employees who chose to
return to state employment (reemployed retirees).2 Option 1 allowed
for the reemployed retiree to continue to receive their pension
benefits until the reemployed retiree earned more than fifty percent of
his or her annual allowance from LASERS during any fiscal year. A
reemployed retiree's benefit would be reduced by any amount in
excess of fifty percent of their annual benefit from LASERS. A
retiree who chose Option 1 could not re-enroll in LASERS and earn
additional service time towards retirement upon reemployment.22
Option 2 allowed a reemployed retiree to regain membership in
LASERS as if the reemployed retiree had never retired, but the retiree
had to repay any benefits, plus interest, received from LASERS. 3
The reemployed retiree also had to pay an amount equal to what the
employer and the employee contributions would have been for the
time the reemployed retiree had been out of state service.24 Under
Option 2, after repaying the State, the reemployed retiree was
considered to have never retired.
Under Option 3, a reemployed retiree could request immediate
suspension of their benefits and be re-enrolled in LASERS on the first
day of reemployment. If the reemployed retiree worked at least
thirty-six months, their benefit would be supplemented by the
additional service. The reemployed retiree's benefits were restored
18. Id. 11:2.
19. Id. 11:412.
20. Id. 11:416.
21. Id. 11:416 (1995).
22. Id. 11:416(A)(1). For example, under Option 1, of an reemployed retiree
who was receiving an annual benefit from LASERS of $20,000, the reemployed
retiree could continue to receive their annual allowance from LASERS until they
made more than $10,000. The reemployed retirees benefit from LASERS would
be reduced by whatever he made in excess of $10,000.
23. Id. 11:416(A)(2).
24. Id. Under Option 2, to reenter the LASERS program, the reemployed
retiree had to purchase the time they had been away from state service and repay
any benefits they received from LASERS.
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as if the employee had never retired upon subsequent retirement.
Under Option 3, if the reemployed retiree did not complete thirty-six
months of additional service, their retirement benefits upon their
second retirement from state service was determined by the service
accrued at their first retirement.
2. Act 455: Providing a Generous Opportunity for Retired
State Employees
Act 455 of the 2001 Regular Legislative Session modified
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416, eliminating the three options
previously available to reemployed retirees.2 6  Under the
modification, a reemployed retiree was eligible for both retirement
benefits and their total compensation from their state employer. After
reemployment, a reemployed retiree's retirement would be suspended
for twelve months. After the twelve-month suspension, the
reemployed retiree would receive both their annual allowance from
LASERS and their compensation from the state employer.27 Further,
if a reemployed retiree reentered state service for over thirty-six
months, his or her retirement allowance was increased "by an amount
that is attributable to the service that occurred during reemployment
and the average compensation that is calculated for the period of such
reemployment., 28 Act 455 became effective on June 30, 2001. The
plaintiffs retired pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:461 as
amended by Act 455.29
3. The 2002 Amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416: The Legislature Reconsiders Its Generous Opportunity.
Act 165 of the 2002 First Extra-Ordinary Session amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:461, repealing the amendments made
by Act 455 of the 2001 Regular Legislative Session.3 ° Act 165
became effective May 9, 2002. Retired employees who reenter state
service would again have to choose between three options with regard
to how their retirement benefits would be affected by reemployment.3
In addition to repealing the changes made by Act 455 for future
reemployed retirees, Act 165 added Louisiana Revised Statutes
25. Id. 11:416(A)(3).
26. 2001 La. Acts No. 455.
27. Id
28. Id.
29. Petition, Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100.
30. 2002 La. Acts No. 165.
31. Id.
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11:416. 1.32 Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 speaks specifically to
those employees who retired after June 30, 2001 and were rehired
before May 9, 2002, including the Department of Correction officers
involved in Smith v. LASERS. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1
forces reemployed retirees to choose between four "irrevocable
options."33 The first three options are the options enumerated in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 as amended by Act 165. The fourth
option allows a reemployed retiree to receive his retirement benefits
after a twelve-month suspension but prevents the employee from
continuing to contribute to the retirement system and accruing
additional service time.34 All four options differ from the plan offered
to state employees who retired and were reemployed between June 30,
2001 and May 9, 2002. Reemployed retirees would no longer be able
to receive both their employment benefits and retirement benefits while
continuing to contribute to statewide retirement systems as previously
provided. Act 165 also gave state employees who had retired and been
rehired before May 9, 2002 thirty days to decide on which of the four
irrevocable options they would choose.35 If the reemployed retirees did
not choose between one of the four options, they would be placed in
Option 3, the "default category."36
1I. SMITH V. LASERS: THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 11:416
AND 11:416.1
Against the factual and legislative backdrop outlined in the
previous sections, the Louisiana Supreme Court was presented with an
32. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 (2004) provides:
A retiree who retired under the provisions of Act No. 455 of the 2001
Regular Session and was rehired prior to the effective date of this Section
in employment which otherwise would render him eligible for membership
in the system shall choose one of the following irrevocable options:
(1) Option 1 as provided for in RS 11:416(A)
(2) Option 2 as provided for in RS 11:416(A)
(3) Option 3 as provided for in RS 11:416(A)
(4) Option 4. At the request of the retiree his retirement
benefits shall be suspended for twelve months following the
effective data of his retirement or until his reemployment
ends, whichever occurs first. The retiree shall receive his
retirement benefits after such suspension, but he shall accrue
no additional service credit during reemployment. Under this
option, neither the retiree nor the employer shall make any
contribution to the system.
33. Id.
34. Id. 11:416.1(4).
35. 2002 La. ActsNo. 165.
36. Id.
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opportunity to resolve issues central to the system of state employee
retirement. Tantamount in this would be determining at what point
the relationship between state employees and statewide public
retirement systems becomes contractual. In Smith v. LASERS, the
Louisiana Supreme Court would also have an opportunity to consider
the meaning of Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974 which provides that membership in a statewide retirement
system shall be contractual.
A. Procedural History
On May 28, 2002, 161 Department of Corrections officers (the
plaintiffs) filed suit seeking ajudgment declaring Louisiana Revised
Statutes 11:416.1 unconstitutional. The plaintiffs had retired and
were reemployed between June 30, 2001 and May 9, 2002, pursuant
to Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416. The plaintiffs argued that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 was unconstitutional because it
violated the Contract Clauses of the Louisiana and United States
Constitutions.37
On June 26, 2002, the Nineteenth Judicial District Court ruled in
the plaintiffs favor, finding Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1
"constitutionally infirm."38 The Court found the statutory provision
in violation of the Contract Clauses of both the United States and
Louisiana Constitutions.39 LASERS appealed the trial court's
decision directly to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
41
B. The Applicable Constitutional Protections of the Louisiana and
United States Constitutions
On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, several key issues of
both federal and state constitutional law were presented. The
Louisiana Supreme Court had to consider the Contract Clauses of the
United States and Louisiana Constitutions, as the plaintiffclaimed the
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 violated the Contract Clauses of
the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Additionally, the
Court had an opportunity to define the true meaning of Article X,
Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution, which recognizes that
membership in a statewide retirement system shall be contractual.41
37. Petition, Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100.
38. Minutes of the Court, Record at 2, Smith, 851 So. 2d 1100.
39. Id.
40. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 grants the Louisiana Supreme Court
jurisdiction over all cases in which "a law or ordinance has been declared
unconstitutional." La. Const. art. V, § 5(D)(1).
41. Id. art X, § 29.
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1. The Contract Clauses of the United States and Louisiana
Constitutions
The Contract Clauses of the United States and Louisiana
Constitutions42 are virtually identical43 and substantially equivalent."
While the language of the clauses is "facially absolute," the clauses
must be interpreted to accommodate the "inherent police power of the
state to safeguard the vital interest of its people."45 The Contract
Clause was initially the primary provision of the United States
Constitution used to invalidate legislation that infringed on private
property rights. The clause has lost some of its importance over the
last century.46 This is attributable largely to the rise of the use of the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.47
The United States Supreme Court's most prominent early
twentieth century Contract Clause case is Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell.41 In Blaisdell, the Supreme Court sustained
a debtor relief law despite its retroactive impairment of obligations.
Minnesota had enacted a law which allowed for the extension of
home mortgages before a mortgage company could foreclose during
the Great Depression. The mortgage company sued, claiming that the
law violated the Contract Clause. In rejecting the mortgage
company's contention, the Supreme Court recognized the state's
power to enact legislation in emergency situations to protect the
security of its people, even when such legislation impairs the
obligation of contracts.49
While the Court gave governments the power to impair contracts
between private entities to protect the security of its people, just one
year later the Court denied the government the power to impinge its
42. The United States Constitution states "[n]o state shall.., pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts ......
U.S. Const art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides "[n]o bill
of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
enacted." La. Const. art. I, § 23.
43. Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1994), 630 So. 2d 714, 728.
44. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Bd. Dist. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 496
So. 2d 281, 291 (La. 1986).
45. Segura, 630 So. 2d 714 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc v. Kansas
Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,410, 103 S. Ct. 697, 704 (1983)). These "vital
interests" include the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Ronald D. Rotunda
& John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 15.8
(3d ed. 1999).
46. See Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 45, § 15.8.
47. Id. ("During the Court's substantive due process era the contract clause
faded in importance.").
48. 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
49. Id. at 424-30, 54 S. Ct. at 235-37.
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own obligations in the Gold Clause cases." The Gold Clause cases
involved Congress's attempt to amend outstanding bonds. The bonds
were issued as payable in gold. Congress amended a statute
authorizing the bonds to be payable only in legal tender, thereby
reducing the value of the bonds. The Court recognized the existence
of a dual standard of review in Contract Clause cases when the
government impinges its own obligations. The Court held there "is
a clear distinction" between the power of Congress to regulate the
contracts of private parties and to alter its own obligations.5' The
Court went on to find that Congress had violated the Contracts Clause
when it retroactively altered the essential terms of its own
obligation. 2
The United States Supreme Court provided further guidance to
courts who are forced to analyze Contract Clause questions when a
government entity is a party in United States Trust Company of New
York v. New Jersey.53 In 1962, New York and New Jersey issued
parallel statutes which limited the ability of the New York and New
Jersey Port Authority to subsidize rail passenger transportation from
other revenues." The statutory covenant allowed the Port Authority
to receive financing at a better interest rate because the statutes
guaranteed that rail passenger transportation would not be a drain on
the ability of the port authority to repay their debt obligations. In
1974, New York and New Jersey issued parallel statutes repealing the
1962 covenant. Following this, a trustee for the United States Trust
Company, a holder of Port Authority bonds, filed suit claiming the
statutory repeal was a violation of the Contract Clause.55 The Court
held that the Contract Clause prohibited the retroactive repeal of the
1962 covenant, finding when a state regulates its own obligation, it
faces a different level of scrutiny than when it regulates the contracts
of private individuals. 6 The Court then concluded that while the
"Contract Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract that
surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty," a financial
obligation is not an essential attribute of a state's sovereignty and can
be bargained away by the legislature.57 Even when a state
retroactively alters an obligation which is not an essential attribute of
50. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935); Norman v.
Baltimore, 294 U.S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S.
317, 55 S. Ct. 428 (1935).
51. Perry, 294 U.S. at 352, 55 S. Ct. at 435.
52. Id.
53. 431 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1505 (1977).
54. Id. at 3, 97 S. Ct. at 1508.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 23, 97 S. Ct. at 1518.
57. Id. at 23-24, 97 S. Ct. at 1518-19.
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the sovereignty of the state, there is not a per se violation of the
Contract Clause.58 A court must examine whether the impairment
was "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose."'59 While some deference is due to the state's legislative
body, the courts should consider the "State's self interest." ' After
finding that the 1974 repeal was not reasonable and necessary, the
Supreme Court ruled the 1974 repeal unconstitutional.6'
Clearly, a dual standard exist for Contract Clause cases. When
the state impinges its own obligation, the state action is more
carefully scrutinized. Despite this strict scrutiny, the action may be
considered a reasonable exercise of the state's police power if it is
reasonably necessary to serve an important public purpose.
2. Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution
Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution (Section 29)
recognizes a contractual relationship exists between the state and state
employees who are enrolled in any statewide retirement system.62
Section 29 also recognizes that accrued benefits of members in the
system shall not be diminished or impaired, and "future benefit
provisions ...shall be altered only by legislative enactment., 63
Section 29 was added during the 1974 Constitutional Convention as
an attempt by the delegates of the State Constitutional Convention to
afford increased protection to state employees. 64 The very nature of
58. Id. at 26, 97 S. Ct. at 1519.
59. Id. at 25, 97 S. Ct. at 1519.
60. Id. at 26, 97 S. Ct. at 1520.
61. 431 U.S. at 34, 97 S. Ct. at 1523.
62. La. Const. art. X, § 29(B) (emphasis added):
The legislature shall enact laws providing for retirement of officials and
employees of the state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions,
including persons employed jointly by state and federal agencies other
than those in military service, through the establishment of one or more
retirement systems. Membership in any retirement system of the state or
of a political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship
between employee and employer, and the state shall guarantee benefits
payable to a member of a state retirement system or retiree or to his
lawful beneficiary upon his death.
63. Id. § 29(E)(5) ("The accrued benefits of members of any state or statewide
public retirement system shall not be diminished or impaired. Future benefit
provisions for members of the state and statewide public retirement system shall
only be altered by legislative enactment.").
64. Lee Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Horatory" Provisions in the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 674-75 (1983) ("Designating
membership in a public retirement system 'a contractual relationship' is an attempt
to invoke the constitutional protection against impairment of the obligation of
contracts.").I
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state employment makes such a constitutional expression by the
people of Louisiana understandable. Public employees enjoy
increased benefits, including increased protection in retirement plans
and further process before dismissal, in exchange for decreased pay
compared to the private sector. The increased protection afforded
public employees is an attempt by the people of the State to maintain
a productive and efficient public workforce.65
C. The Louisiana Supreme Court's Decision
Against the backdrop of the increased protection for public
employees provided by Section 29 and the United States and
Louisiana Contract Clauses, the Louisiana Supreme Court had to
determine the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes
14:416.1. At first glance, it appeared the case would turn on the
Court's contract clause analysis. However, the majority took an
awkward path, focusing on the classification of the benefits provided
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:416, downplaying the importance
of its Contract Clause analysis.
1. The Majority: "Reemployment" Is Not Retirement
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a five-to-two vote, reversed the
lower court's ruling, finding Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1
constitutional.66 Justice Victory, writing for the majority, explained
that Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 did not violate the Contract
Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions because the
plaintiffs had no vested right in the additional benefits provided under
the previous law.67 Because the plaintiffs' rights had not vested, the
Court found that no contract existed. The Court explained that the
plaintiffs could not have a vested right until the plaintiffs had been
reemployed for twelve months.68 The benefits were not part of the
plaintiffs' retirement, the majority contended, but rather part of the
plaintiffs' reemployment.69 These reemployment benefits did not vest
until the plaintiffs had been reemployed for twelve months, and until
65. Id. See also Andrew C. Mackenzie, Spiller v. State: Determining the
Nature of Public Employees' Rights to Their Pensions, 46 Me. L. Rev. 355, 358.
(1994).
66. Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100.
67. Id. at 1105. The Court looks to the legislative definition of vested rights,
as "when a member obtains retirement eligibility as to the age and service in
accordance with the provision of this chapter." Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:403(33).
68. Smith, 851 So. 2dat 1106.
69. Id. at 1107.
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that point the legislature could freely modify the "details of a
contributory retirement system."7" The Court looked to earlier rulings
propagating this rule, finding that courts have "consistently held that
a public employee's right to retirement does not 'vest' until eligibility
for retirement is attained, reemployed benefits for retirees likewise do
not vest until eligibility as to age and service is attained."'"
The Louisiana Supreme Court then outlined what it determined
to be the correct standard to apply when a law potentially violates the
Contract Clause, embracing the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and
Light.72 The Louisiana Supreme Court initially embraced the Energy
Reserves framework in Segura v. Frank.73 Applying the Energy
Reserves analysis, the Court found that no contractual relationship
existed between LASERS and the plaintiffs. Membership in a
retirement system, the majority contended, did not create a
contractual relationship until the party's rights in the system vest once
age and service are met.74 Under the facts of LASERS, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs' rights would not have vested until
twelve months into reemployment.75
Despite finding its "Contract Clause analysis is at an end"76 because
no contractual relationship existed, the Court curiously went on to
examine the remainder of the Energy Reserves framework in a
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Patterson v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 306 (La. 1975);
Faulk v. State, 382 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); State, ex rel. Murray v. Bd.
of Trustees of Police Pension Fund for City of New Orleans, 259 So. 2d 613 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972); Adolph v. Sewerage & Water Bd. Pension Comm., 202 So. 2d
664 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Young v. Dep't of Highways, 160 So.2d 391 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1964); Bowen v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 76 So. 2d
430 (La. App. Orl. 1954)). In all of these cases cited by the majority, the majority
fails to recognize that the alterations to the retirement plans took place before the
state employees retired. Here, the employees had retired, so even under the Court's
outdated approach to retirement benefits, these cases are distinguishable.
72. Id. at 1109 (citing Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light, 459
U.S. 400, 103 S. Ct. 697). To be in violation ofthe Contract Clause, the Court must
consider: (1) whether the law would impair a contractual relationship, (2) if the
impairment is of "constitutional dimension," (3) whether a signification and
legitimate public purpose exist to justify the regulation, and (4) whether the
"adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based
upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose
justifying the legislation's adoption." Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 410-13, 103
S. Ct. at 704-05.
73. 93-1271 (La. 1994), 630 So. 2d 714. In Segura, the Court upheld the
retroactive application of legislation which impaired the obligation of contracts
between private parties. Id.
74. Smith, 851 So. 2dat 1106.
75. Id. at 1108.
76. Id.at1110.
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footnote.77 The Court recognized the gravity of the plaintiffs' decisions
to retire from state service, but found that the impairment was not
substantial, stating, "[s]tate regulation that restricts a party to the gains
it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily constitute
a substantial impairment."78 The Court further determined that "any
loss [the plaintiffs] suffered . . . was a known risk which they
knowingly undertook."79 Interestingly, the Court recognized that the
plaintiffs suffered some detriment, but not of the constitutional
dimension necessary to implicate constitutional concerns.
Despite finding no contractual relationship between the parties and
no substantial impairment suffered by the plaintiffs, the Court
continued still with its Contract Clause analysis.- 0 Applying the third
step of the Energy Reserves framework, the Court found that the
plaintiffs suffered no detriment by enactment of Act 165.81 The Court
also found that any leave the plaintiffs lost from annual or sick leave
was credited to their retirement, and the provisions of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 11:416.1 sufficiently provided for relief from all
forms of harm that the plaintiffs may have suffered due to its
enactment.82 The Court failed to recognize that some of the plaintiffs'
sick and annual leave could not be transferred, and the plaintiffs lost all
of their compensatory time. Why the Court continued its Contract
Clause discussion after finding no contract existed is curious and leaves
open the possibility that the Court was uncertain of its analysis of
whether a contract existed.
2. The Dissent
Justice Knoll, joined by Justice Wiemer, dissented, finding three
flaws with the majority's approach. 3 Justice Knoll first disagreed
with the majority's assertion that the plaintiffs had no rights in the
benefit provided for by Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.84 The
dissent contended the plaintiffs had contractually based rights in the
77. Id. at 1110 n.7 (outlining the four-step Energy Reserves Contract Clause
analysis).
78. Id. (citing Segura v. Frank,93-1271 (La. 1994), 630 So. 2d 714, 729). In
Segura, the impairment was not substantial because the state regulation did not alter
what the parties had reasonably expected to gain from the contract. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Perhaps the Court was unsure with regard to its determination the
plaintiffs had no contractual right and wanted to continue with its Contract Clause
analysis, eyeing a possible writ of certiorari by the plaintiffs to the United States
Supreme Court.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1111 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at lIll.
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benefit provided by Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 at retirement
pursuant to Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution.85
After recognizing the rights in Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 as
contractually based, the dissent contended that the majority applied
the incorrect Contract Clause analysis to the case.86 Justice Knoll
thought the majority failed to recognize that the State was modifying
its own obligation and, consequently, applied the incorrect Contract
Clause analysis. She believed the appropriate test was enunciated by
the Supreme Court in United States Trust Company v. New Jersey."
After analyzing the case under the framework provided for in United
States Trust Company, Justice Knoll concluded that a violation of the
Contract Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, in
fact, did exist.
Concluding that the lower court's decision should be upheld,
Justice Knoll outlined her disagreement with the majority's
application of other states' precedent to the instant case. 8 Justice
Knoll believed that the Court incorrectly relied on the Rhode Island
case of RetiredAdjunct Professors of State ofRhode Island v. Lincoln
C. Almond, Governor of State of Rhode Island.9 As evidence of the
majority's erroneous reliance on the Rhode Island case, Justice Knoll
pointed to other states which have recognized membership in
retirement systems as evidence of the majority's incorrect reliance on
Retired Adjunct Professors. 90
85. Id. The majority found that no vested right existed, deciding instead that
the benefits offered under Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 were "reemployment
benefits." Instead, Justice Knoll would have classified these benefits as "retirement
benefit." Id. This was a clear attempt by Justice Knoll to classify the benefits
provided by the statute in a manner which would provide the plaintiffs with the
increased constitutional protection provided for by Article X, Section 29 of the
Louisiana Constitution.
86. Id. at 1113.
87. 431 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1505 (1977). In United States Trust Company, the
United States Supreme Court found the Contract Clause prohibited the repeal of a
statutory covenant which guaranteed the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey's
reserve fund from depletion. Had the repeal been allowed, the financing of certain
bonds would have not been backed by the states. The Court found when a state
impairs its own obligation, the Court must: (a) determine whether the state law
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship and (b) determine
whether the impairment is both reasonable and necessary to serve and important
public purpose. Id.
88. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1112.
89. 690 A.2d 1342 (R.I. 1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court used this case
as persuasive authority in its determination the plaintiffs had no vested right in the
matter. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1113.
90. Smith, 851 So. 2d. at 1113 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing Bailey v. North
Carolina, 500 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 1998); Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v.
Oregon, 918 P.2d 765 (Ore. 1996); Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1994);
Halpin v. Nebraska State Patrolmen's Retirement Sys., 320 N.W.2d 910 (Neb.
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In sum, the majority and dissenting opinions in LASERS differ on
three major points. First, the opinions differ as to the proper
classification of the benefits provided for by Act 455. While the
majority classified the benefits as reemployment benefits, subject to
unconstrained legislative modification until the employee has been
reemployed for twelve months, the dissent characterizes them as
retirement benefits which became contractual when the plaintiffs
initially retired. Inherent in this distinction is the Court's
determination of when rights in retirement vest or when membership
in a retirement plan should be considered contractual in nature.
Secondly, the Court is divided as to which Contract's Clause standard
should apply under the facts presented in LASERS. The dissent
argued for a stricter Contracts Clause standard, operating from the
premise that the State is altering its own obligation. The majority
applied theContract Clause test where the government action is
impairing the obligation of private parties. Lastly, the Court
differed as to the persuasiveness of the approaches adopted by various
states. The majority looked to other states which continue to view
public retirement plans as gratuities,92 while the dissent looked to
jurisdictions which promulgate a more progressive view of retirement
systems.93 The following sections critically analyze these divergent
approaches in an effort to identify the proper conceptualization of
state employee retirement plans in Louisiana.
III. RETIREMENT VERSUS REEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: THE COURT
IMPORTS ADDITIONAL CRITERIA TO RECEIVE BENEFITS
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, state workers in
Louisiana have no rights to any benefit provided by a retirement
system until the rights vest. Once rights vest, the Court has
recognized that a contractual relationship exists between the
beneficiary and the state. Typically, the courts have considered
retirement (or eligibility to retire) as the critical component to the
vesting of rights. Although the plaintiffs in this case had clearly
retired, the Court found that the plaintiffs retirement benefit did not
encompass the benefits outlined in Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416. According to the Court, those benefits should be considered
reemployment benefits which would not vest until the plaintiffs were
reemployed for a certain time period.94 Because the plaintiffs had no
vested contractual right in these benefits, the legislature could modify
1982)). See infra notes 140-165.
91. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1113-14 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1109.
93. Id. at 1113 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1110.
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the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 without
implicating the Contract Clauses.
The Court erred when it embraced this logic, missing an
opportunity to acknowledge the desire of the people of Louisiana as
expressed in Article X, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution, to
afford increased protection for state employees in statewide
retirement systems. An increased level of protection provides state
employees with some rights in their retirement before vesting, and
this approach is followed by most other states which provides for
constitutional protection of retirement benefits.95 The Court instead
embraced a confusing and somewhat arbitrary vison of retirement
benefits as dependent upon whether the rights are considered to have
accrued or vested. Most states have long abandoned this confusing
determination and methodology.
A. Accrued and Vested Rights: The Court Embraces an Outdated
View of Retirement Benefits
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the essential component
of Smith v. LASERS to be whether the rights of the plaintiffs had
vested or accrued. The Court first determined the benefits provided
under Act 455 were not part of the plaintiffs' retirement, but should
be considered part of their reemployment.96 After this unprecedented
reclassification of the benefits provided to state workers, the Court
looked to previous cases dealing with alterations to retirement plans
for a determination of when reemployment rights actually vest.9 The
Court found that since the plaintiffs' benefits were part of a
reemployment plan, rights in those plans of benefits would not vest
until the employees ceased employment a second time or were
reemployed for twelve months.98 According to the Court, the
plaintiffs could have no right in the benefit until they were actually
receiving the benefit.
While the Court accepts that the plaintiffs' had retired, the Court
decided that the benefits outlined in Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416 were not part of the plaintiffs' retirement, but rather part of
the plaintiffs' reemployment.99 This distinction was essential for the
95. See infra Part IV.B.I.
96. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1106.
97. Never before has the Court made this determination. In fact,
"reemployment" is found nowhere in the Revised Statutes.
98. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1107.
99. As noted by Justice Knoll in her dissent, Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416.1 begins "a retiree who retired under the provisions of Act 455 of the
Regular Session" and continues "any person who retired under the provisions of Act
No. 455 of the 2001 Regular Session of the Legislature." Id. at 1111 (citing La. RS
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Court, as the Court has long recognized that when rights vest, they
cannot be altered or impaired without raising questions under the
Contracts Clauses. In determining when rights vest, the Court relied
on factually distinguishable precedent °° and embraced an outdated,
confusing standard. Under the Court's view, benefits from statewide
retirement systems are mere gratuities from the State, susceptible to
any legislative modification and afforded no protection from
diminishment or impairment until the rights vest.
In reaching its conclusion in Smith v. LASERS, the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered a line of cases which dealt with changes
to retirement systems before the parties had retired. 0 ' In these cases,
the Court had found that the changes to retirement systems did not
give rise to constitutional questions, as the parties had no rights in
their future retirement benefits.'0 2 Retirement, or eligibility to retire,
the Court found, provides the necessary and essential component to
consider retirement benefits as vested and, therefore, contractual.1
0 3
All the cases cited by the majority are factually distinguishable from
the current matter.0 It is undisputed that the plaintiff in LASERS
retired. The question instead is what benefits were provided in the
plaintiffs' retirement. The Court held that the rights which accrued
or became vested when the plaintiffs retired did not include the
benefits provided under Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.'05 Citing
Sawicki v. K/S Stavenger Prince, 106 the Court determined that those
rights had not vested because vested rights must be absolute,
complete and unconditional.0 7 According to the Court in Sawicki, a
"mere expectancy of future benefit ... does not constitute a vested
right."'0 8  The Court should not have imported this idea of a vested
right into the current matter, as the cases are too factually distinct.
Sawicki dealt with the retroactive application of legislation
11:416.1 (2004)).
100. These cases all dealt with changes before any retirement and are therefore
different.
101. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1107 (citing Patterson v. City of Baton Rouge, 309 So.
2d 306 (La. 1975); Faulk v. State, 382 So. 2d 992 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); State,
ex rel. Murray v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund for City of New Orleans,
259 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Adolph v. Sewerage & Water Bd. Pension
Comm., 202 So. 2d 664 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Young v. Dep't of Highways, 160
So. 2d 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Bowen v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension
Fund, 76 So. 2d 430 (La. App. Orl. 1954)).
102. Id. at 1107.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 71 (noting that in all the cases cited by the majority, the
alterations in those cases took place before the plaintiffs had ever retired).
105. Smith, 851 So. 2datl1110.
106. 2001-0528 (La. 2001), 802 So. 2d 598.
107. Smith, 851 So. 2dat 1106.
108. Sawicki, 802 So. 2d at 604.
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prohibiting the enforcement of a forum selection clause and key to the
determination was the point at which the claim vested. Instead of
looking to Sawicki, the Court should have looked to factually
analogous cases dealing with public retirement programs. In these
cases, the Court has recognized a future benefit may be considered a
vested right. In Spragio v. Board of Trustees of State Employees
Group Benefits Program, a Louisiana court recognized that rights to
retirement exist even if the rights may not be demanded. 9 In
Spragio, the plaintiff ceased public employment at the age of forty-
nine. He had met his service requirements. Despite having the
required service, he could not receive benefits until he was fifty-five.
Between the time he was able to receive benefits and the time he
retired, the Board changed certain rules with regard to an insurance
program. The Court found that the rights, although only future
benefits and only a mere expectancy, had vested when the employee
met the service requirements and retired. 0 Any changes made after
that point were of no consequence to the plaintiff because although
the plaintiff could not demand the right, the rights could not be
altered or impaired
The problems associated with determining what rights are vested
under a public retirement system are obvious, and the import of
Sawicki's determination of a vested right may lead to additional
confusion. Some rights are uncertain until some future date, even
dependent upon the happening of certain events."' Additionally, to
say that such rights do not exist and to import this into the realm of
retirement benefits is to ignore the increased protection afforded by
the Louisiana Constitution. 112 The Court's current approach places
too heavy a reliance on the ability of the claimant to access the benefit
instead of considering the claimant's right to the benefit.
Additionally, to import the concept of reemployment into the
109. 468 So. 2d 1323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), cert denied, 472 So. 2d 32 (La.
1985).
110. Id.
111. In fact, in the plaintiffs' brief for rehearing, the plaintiffs point out that
many obligations only promise a future benefit, or the potential of a future benefit
if the obligation still exists for other legal purposes. The plaintiffs point to certain
financial instruments where the holder ofa note does not have an immediate benefit,
but a future one, as an example of one such obligation. Additionally, Louisiana has
long recognized conditional or suspensive obligations may not be demanded until
some future event. Plaintiffs' Brief for Rehearing, Smith, 851 So. 2d 1100.
112. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 is filled with instances in which more
protection is provided than provided under the federal constitution. For example,
in Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the
Louisiana Constitution affords greater protection for freedom of speech and the
press and the freedom to openly criticize the government. 94-2919 (La. 1995), 650
So. 2d 738.
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determination of when rights vest further confuses an already
confusing area of the law. While retirement is statutorily defined,' 3
reemployment is mentioned nowhere in the Revised Statutes.
The Court erred when it determined that the plaintiffs had no
rights in the public retirement system. The determination of rights
that the Court employed is outdated, confusing, and arbitrary. The
Court should abandon the standard for considering the rights of
public employees in public retirement systems utilized in Smith v.
LASERS and move toward a more modem approach to public
retirement systems. Not only would this give proper deference to the
Louisiana Constitution, it would move Louisiana more in line with
the view of public retirement systems expressed by other states that
constitutionally recognize retirement benefits or membership in
statewide retirement systems as contractual.l"4
B. The Proper Deference to Louisiana Constitution Article X,
Section 29
The Court should have considered an approach which gives
greater deference to the wording of Section 29, and abandoned the
problematic "vested" and "accrued" determination. Instead of
recognizing membership in public retirement systems as a mere
gratuity, the Court should have recognized that some limited rights
exist in membership itself. This approach has been recognized by
most other states and would have given the proper deference to the
Louisiana constitutional provisions addressing membership in
statewide retirement systems. Louisiana's Constitution recognizes
the relationship between the State and employees who are enrolled in
a statewide retirement system as a contractual relationship." 5 The
people of Louisiana expressed their desire to provide increased
protection for state employees who enter into retirement systems
through this provision."' Instead of respecting the protection
afforded by Section 29, the Court found that membership in the
statewide retirement system does not occur until individuals have
reached the age and service requirements for retirement. The Court
relied on Section 29(e) which states the legislature may alter future
benefit provisions.1 ' This view fails to consider the rationale
underlying Section 29 and reads "future benefit provision" so broadly
that any alteration to a public retirement system would be
constitutionally permissible, therefore making the protection provided
113. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:403(24) (2004).
114. See infra notes 137-165.
115. La. Const. art X, § 29.
116. Hargrave, supra note 64, at 675.
117. La. Const. art X, § 29.
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by Section 29 useless. The constitutional language which provides
for increased protection by state employees in retirement systems,
according to the Court, leads to the same level of protection that the
Court would provide if the language did not exist.118 Section 29,
according to the Court's holding, is meaningless.
The rationale for enacting a constitutional provision recognizing
membership in a statewide retirement system as contractual can easily
be understood. The very nature of state employment is different from
private employment. Public employees enjoy increased benefits,
including increased protection in retirement plans through Section 29
in exchange for decreased pay as compared to the private sector. 
11
These added benefits are needed to maintain a productive and
efficient public workforce. For the Court to not recognize this
constitutional provision is a worrisome precedent.
Under the majority's view, the legislature may make changes to
the retirement system after the employee's acceptance of the
retirement, but before the receipt of payment, contrary to its own
precedent. 2 0  The dissent takes a different approach, reading
membership as creating the contract with the rights determined at
retirement. 2 ' Under both approaches, retirement plays a critical role.
Under either approach, membership in a retirement system is still
meaningless and Section 29 is still ignored. Instead of considering
retirement as the essential act, the Court should consider membership
as the essential act, as Section 29 defines. This approach would make
retirement plans more than mere gratuities wholly susceptible of
legislative modification as espoused in the majority opinion.
Tangential changes to retirement systems could be sustained under
the Contract Clauses and the State would still be allowed to repeal
obligations under certain circumstances. This view would give
proper deference to the language of the Louisiana Constitution,
subjecting decisions regarding changes to public retirement systems
to a scrutiny that the delegates of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
intended, namely, that afforded by the Contract Clauses.122
118. Indeed, in its decision, the Court relied on cases which held that a
contractual right did not exist before retirement. These cases were all decided
before the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, which provided for the increased
protection, was adopted.
119. See Hargrave, supra note 64, at 675.
120. Plaintiffs Brief for Rehearing, Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003),
851 So. 2d 1100.
121. Smith, 851 So. 2dat 1113.
122. Id. at 1112 (Knoll, J., dissenting). As mentioned by Justice Knoll in the
dissent, during the debate regarding Article X, Section 29, the delegates made clear
they chose the "contractual relationship" language to invoke the protections
afforded by the Louisiana and United States Constitutions to public retirement
systems.
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NOTES
IV. CONTRACT CLAUSE ANALYSIS: DETERMINING THE CORRECT
STANDARD TO APPLY
A. Correct Test v. Test Applied. The Court Takes Too Rigid
an Approach to the Contract Clauses
Had the Court given more deference to the wording of the
Louisiana Constitutions and recognized the increase protection
afforded by Section 29, the Contract Clauses would have been critical
in determining whether changes to statewide retirement systems are
permissible. Both the majority and dissenting opinions address
whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 violated the Contract
Clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The
majority opinion, in finding that no contract existed, did little more
than acknowledge most of its Contract Clause analysis. 123  The
majority and dissenting opinions also applied different tests for
determining the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416.1. The majority stated that "the appropriate Contract Clause
standard" was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Energy Reserves,
Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light.12' The dissent recognized that a
"dual standard of review" existed for impairment of contract cases
125
because when a state impairs its own contracts it faces a "more
stringent examination under the Contract Clause than would laws
regulating contractual relationships between private parties.' 26
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that when a state impinges its own obligations or contracts, a different
standard of review should be applied compared to when state action
impinges obligations or contracts of private parties. The majority's
application of the Energy Reserves standard was erroneous, and the
Court should have applied the two-part test outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in United States Trust Company, as
promulgated by the dissent.'27 As outlined in United States Trust
Company, the Court should have initially considered whether the
impairment was substantial. After determining that an impairment
was substantial, the Court must consider whether the action was a
123. Id.at1llOn.7.
124. Id. at 1109.
125. Id. at 1113 (Knoll, J., dissenting) (citing United States Trust Company of
New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25, 97 S. Ct. 1505, 1519 n.25 (1977)
(citing Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51, 55 S. Ct. 432, 435 (1935)).
126. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 n.15, 98 S. Ct
2716, 2722 n. 15 (1978) (citing United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22-23, 97 S. Ct. at
1517-18).
127. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1113 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
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permissible exercise of the State's power if it was reasonably
necessary to serve an important public purpose, therefore preventing
the state action from being declared in violation of the Contract
Clause by the Court.
B. Applying the Correct Contract Clause Test
1. Substantial Impairment
When a state impairs its own obligation or contract, a court
should first consider whether the impairment is substantial. 28 The
majority found that the impairment was not substantial, stating, "state
regulation that restricts a party to the gains it reasonably expected
from the contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial
impairment." 2 9  While concluding that this impairment was
insubstantial, the Court provided no guidance with regard to what
might constitute a substantial impairment. The dissent found that a
substantial impairment did exist, supported by the plaintiffs' loss of
11,800 hours of compensatory time and the fact that the plaintiffs
suffered financially from the enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes
11:416.1.130
In Allied Steel Company v. Sapnnaus, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that when a state alters its own obligation, reliance by
the parties is paramount when considering whether the enactment of
a new law acted as a substantial impairment. 3' Here, the plaintiffs
clearly relied on the repealed statute when deciding to retire. The
plaintiffs testified that they relied on the provision of the statute to
plan for their future, some consulting with their personal
accountants.' 32 In fact, reliance by the plaintiffs was never an issue
in the case. The wording of the statute was the sole reason the
plaintiffs retired. The plaintiffs' motivation, to take advantage of the
law which was drafted, debated, and adopted in their benefit, does not
make their reliance any less important, and the impairment any less
substantial. The economic benefits of their compensatory time,
losing of accrued sick and annual leave, and changes to the timing of
some of their retirements are impairments which the plaintiffs
128. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244 n.15, 98 S. Ct. at 2722.
129. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1110 n.7 (citing Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1994),
630 So. 2d 714, 729 (citing Energy Reserves, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.,
459 U.S. 400, 411,103 S. Ct. 697,704). It is important to note that besides clearly
broadly applying this language, Energy Reserves and Segura dealt with impairments
to private party contracts, not a relationship between the state and private parties.
130. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1117 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
131. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244, 98 S. Ct. at 2722.
132. Record at 103, Smith, 851 So. 2d 1100 (testimony of Gregg Smith).
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suffered through the enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1.
The legislature hindered the plaintiffs' financial and economic
interest as the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the language of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416 pursuant to Act 455. Clearly, the
plaintiffs suffered a substantial impairment due to the enactment of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1.
2. Reasonably Necessary
Under the second and final step in the Contract Clause analysis
for public entities, the Court should consider whether the impairment
is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." '133
The impairment of a contract may be saved from being declared
unconstitutional as the protections afforded by the Contract Clauses
of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions are not absolute. In
this determination, the Court should consider whether a less drastic
modification would have been sufficient to achieve the governments
goals. 34 A state retains the authority to enact laws to "safeguard the
vital interest of [its] people," and states are given great deference in
determining whether the legislation altering an obligation is
reasonable and necessary. 135 However, this deference should be
considered in light of the fact that the state's self interest is often at
stake. 136
The dissent notes that the majority did not address whether the
impairment was reasonable and necessary and goes on to find the
modification unreasonable and unnecessary because a less drastic
modification would have sufficiently achieved the state's
objectives.'37 The financial miscalculations which led to the
enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416.1 did not make its
enactment reasonable and necessary. The legislature could have, and
did by amending Louisiana Revised Statutes 11:416, simply altered
the law for future beneficiaries. The financial miscalculation was not
so severe as to bankrupt or financially impair LASERS, as LASERS
own counsel stated that the under-estimization did not threaten the
actuarial soundness of LASERS.'38
133. United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,25,
97 S. Ct. 1505, 1519 (1977).
134. See Hargrave, supra note 64, at 675.
135. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231
(1934).
136. United States Trust Company of New York, 431 U.S. at 25, 97 S. Ct. at
1519.
137. Smith v. LASERS, 2002-2161 (La. 2003), 851 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Knoll,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. (citing LASERS counsel at oral arguments).
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V. CONSIDERING OTHER STATES: INCREASED PROTECTION FOR
STATE EMPLOYEES
A. The Court's Reliance on Other States
Lastly, both the majority and the dissent looked to the experience
of other states to support their positions. The majority looked to other
states to show that enrollment in retirement systems should not be
recognized as contractual obligations. 3 9 According to the majority's
approach, and the cases cited, the essential component of a retirement
plan becoming contractual in nature is vesting. 4 ' Vesting occurs,
according to the Louisiana Supreme Court, when the age and service
requirements are met. The dissent looked to other states to combat
the majority's assertion that retirement systems should not be
recognized as contractual obligations before age and service is met.
The dissent recognized that most states have abandoned the gratuity
approach to public pensions which the majority embraces' 4' -
The majority relied heavily on Retired Professors of Rhode
Island.'42 This reliance was misplaced for several reasons. The
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Retired Professors of Rhode Island
held that the state General Assembly could modify the number of
hours that retired professors could work before losing their eligibility
to receive their pension. The case is factually similar to Smith v.
LASERS. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to
acknowledge that the opinion in Retired Professors of Rhode Island
has been limited by several subsequent decisions, both by Rhode
Island and federal courts. 4 3  Additionally, the Court failed to
139. Id. at 1109.
140. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court "has never utilized a Contract Clause
analysis to invalidate changes to the state's retirement system which did not take
away vested rights." Id. The Smith court cited Retired Adjunct Professors of
Rhode Island v. Almond, Governor of Rhode Island, where the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found "that converting the reemployment opportunities formerly
available to these public pensioners into legally enforceable contract rights would
'play havoc with the basic principals of contract law, traditional contract clause
analysis, and, most importantly, the fundamental legislative prerogative to reserve
to itself the implicit power of statutory amendment and modification." 690 A.2d
1342, 1346 (R.I. 1997).
141. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1114 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
142. Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d 1342.
143. SeeNonnenmacherv. City of Warwick, 97 WL839913 (R.I. Super. 1997)
(finding that the Contracts Clause applied when the state government altered
benefits to retired, disabled firefighters); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Retirement Bd. ofthe
Rhode Island Employees Retirement Sys., 972 F. Supp. 100 (D.R.I. 1997), vacated
by 172 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied by Casey v. Retirement Bd. of the
Rhode Island Employees Retirement Sys., 528 U.S. 929, 120 S. Ct. 326 (1999)
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acknowledge that the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied extensively
on Rhode Island's lack of a statutory directive classifying benefits as
contractual in nature.'" The Rhode Island Supreme Court forewent
a Contracts Clause analysis, finding the state legislature was acting
within its power when it reserved the power to modify the retirement
plan of state workers."' Through Article X, Section 29 of the
Louisiana Constitution, Louisiana has unequivocally surrendered this
"fundamental legislative prerogative." The Louisiana Supreme Court
should have not considered Rhode Island as such persuasive
authority. Considering Louisiana's constitutional recognition of
membership in retirement plans as contractual, the Court should have
considered decisions from states with similar constitutional or
statutory protections.
B. Considering Other States: A More Comprehensive Look
1. States Move Away from Gratuity Approach
The determination of how to treat public employees' rights to
pensions has been part of the judicial landscape since the late
nineteenth century. In Pennie v. Reis, the United States Supreme
Court found that pension plans are a "mere expectancy created by the
law and liable to be revoked or destroyed by the same authority."'46
Most state courts adopted this view, finding pensions as "gratuities,"
subject to legislative modification without regard to the employees'
interest."' However, over the course of the twentieth century, the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions abandoned this view.'48
Today, only two states adhere strictly to the gratuity approach.'49
Some jurisdictions employ the view adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court and do not recognize retirement benefits as
(holding that the Rhode Island General Assembly violated the Contract Clause by
enacting legislation which terminated the plaintiffs' membership in a statewide
retirement system).
144. Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d. at 1345. The dissent in Smith
mentions this lack of afforded protection. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 1112 n.3 (Knoll, J.,
dissenting).
145. RetiredAdjunct Professors, 690 A.2d 1342. The Court found the alteration
was an expression of the "fundamental legislative prerogative to reserve to itself the
implicit power of statutory amendment and modification," and this was the most
important reason to forego a Contract Clause analysis. Id. at 1346.
146. 132 U.S. 464,471, 10 S. Ct. 1049, 1051 (1889).
147. Mackenzie, supra note 65, at 358.
148. Id. at 359.
149. Only Texas and Indiana currently adhere to the gratuity approach. Id. See
Ballard v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d 813 (Ind. 1975);
Cook v. Employees Retirement Sys., 514 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
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contractual until the rights have vested at retirement.'50 Most states
have rejected the gratuity approach altogether, believing the gratuity
approach offers inadequate protection for state employees'
pensions.'51 These states provide some form of increased protection
against the alteration of retirement benefits by the legislature.' 1
5 2
2. States with Added Protection
Most states give more protection to employees' rights to pensions
than the Louisiana Supreme Court afforded the plaintiffs in Smith. Of
the states which offer increase protection, five states besides
Louisiana have constitutional provisions providing for protection of
retirement benefits: New York, Illinois, Alaska, Hawaii and
Michigan.'53 Michigan's constitutional provision'54 is facially
different than Louisiana's, recognizing only the protection of accrued
benefits. New York, Illinois, Hawaii, and Alaska have provisions
which are similar to Article X, Section 29 Louisiana's Constitution.
The provisions of the New York and Illinois constitutions facially
provide the greatest protection of public retirement systems and both
have been interpreted broadly. New York's constitutional
provision'55 has been interpreted to recognize membership in a
retirement system as contractual in nature the moment the employee
become a member of the system.'56 The legislature cannot reduce
150. Mackenzie, supra note 65, at 359 n.21.
151. This view is epitomized by the recent Nevada Supreme Court decision,
Nicholas v. State. 992 P.2d 262 (Nev. 2002). In Nicholas, the Nevada Supreme
Court had to decide whether former members of the Nevada legislature were
entitled to certain retirement benefits. Certain members of the legislature retired
under a bill which provided for quadruple the retirement benefits previously
provided. Public outrage was so high that the Governor of Nevada called a special
legislative session for the sole purpose of repealing the law. Between the time the
law was enacted and repealed, the plaintiffs in Nicholas retired. The Court found
that public pensions are limited rights until retirement, at which time they cannot be
impaired without facing constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 265.
152. Mackenzie, supra note 65, at 360.
153. Ridgeley A. Scott, A Skunk at a Garden Party: Remedies for Participants
in State andLocal Pension Plans, 75 Denver U.L. Rev 507, 514 (1998). See also
Darryl B. Simko, OfPublic Pensions, State Constitutional Contract Protection and
Fiscal Restraint, 69 Temple L. Rev. 1059 (1996).
154. Mi. Const. art. 9, § 24 ("The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan
and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a
contractual obligation thereofwhich shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.").
155. N.Y. Const. Art. V, § 7 ("After July first, nineteen hundred forty,
membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division
thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired.").
156. Birbaun v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241,
245 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that the purpose of the constitutional protection is
[Vol. 65908
benefits or alter contributions.157 The Illinois constitutional provision
recognizing that membership in a statewide retirement system is
contractual in nature was modeled after New York's 5 ' and employs
similar language.159 Like New York courts, the Illinois judiciary has
interpreted this provision as a mandate not to allow the legislature to
reduce benefits without being in violation of the Contract Clause of
the federal and state constitutions. 6 ' The Illinois courts also
recognize that a public employees has a "vested right" in the pension
at the time they enter the system, when the employee started to
contribute to the public retirement system. 16' Entering the system has
been defined by both states as when the employee starts to contribute
to the public retirement system. Hawaii and Alaska have similar
constitutional provisions. Hawaii's constitutional provision162 has not
been judicially developed. However, the Alaska constitution'63 has
been developed. Alaska's courts have also recognized that a
contractual relationship between a public employee and the State
begins when the employee enters or begins to contribute to the system,
not when the employee becomes eligible to receive such benefits.)"
Despite recognizing the relationship as contractual, the Alaska courts
have limited this, finding that "reasonable modifications are
permissible."' 65 Alaska's courts are giving the proper deference to the
Contract Clause, and United States Trust Company standard outlined
by the United States Supreme Court.
membership in any pension or retirement system of state was a contractual
relationship the moment the employee became a member of system).
157. McDermott v. McDermott, 507 N.Y.S.2d 390, 398-99 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
158. Scott, supra note 153, at 514.
159. Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 5 ("Membership in any pension or retirement system
of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits
of which shall not be diminished or impaired.").
160. Felt v. Bd. of Trustees of Judges Retirement Sys., 481 N.E. 2d. 698,
699-700 (I11. 985) (upholding a lower court's determination that an amendment
to the Illinois Pension Code was unconstitutional as applied to sitting judges, but
allowing modification to the retirement system for persons becoming judges after
the amendment was enacted).
161. Bosco v. Chicago Transit Auth., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. I11. 2001).
162. Hi. Const. art. 16, § 2 ("Membership in any employees' retirement system
of the State or any political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship,
the accrued benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.").
163. Alaska Const. art. XII, § 7 ("Membership in employee retirement systems
of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship.
Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.").
164. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981).
165. Duncan v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc., 71 P.3d 882, 886
(Alaska 2003).
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Considering these states have constitutional provisions recognizing
members in statewide public retirement systems as contractual, it is
curious why the Court did not consider any of these states' views.
None of the states bind the hands of their legislatures from enacting
changes to the retirement system, but simply recognize the increased
protection that their respective constitutions provide, allowing the
legislature to modify benefits for future public employees.
Additionally, the other jurisdictions recognize membership as the
critical factor in creating a contractual relationship, with membership
occurring at the onset of employment. Had the Louisiana Supreme
Court looked for guidance from these states, it would have embraced
an identical approach and would have provided the protection the
delegates of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1974 intended.
CONCLUSION
In Smith v. LASERS, the Louisiana Supreme Court chose to ignore
the increased protection provided to public employees provided by the
Louisiana Constitution. Additionally, the Court, while embracing the
incorrect Contract Clause analysis, adopted an outdated view of public
retirements systems. Public employees in Louisiana do not have rights
in their retirement as provided for by other states despite a
constitutional expression to the contrary. By embracing the view that
the constitutional expression aimed to provide public employees
retirement benefits did not afford greater protection to public
employees, the Court has set a dangerous and worrisome precedent.
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